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Anti-bribery and Corruption Policies
in International Sports Governing
Bodies
Christina Philippou* and Tony Hines
Accounting and Financial Management, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom
International Sports Governing Bodies (“ISGBs”) are diverse in their aims but share a
need to maintain a reputation of accountability in the eyes of their stakeholders. While
some literature analyses the general governance concerns faced by these organizations,
there is limited focus on anti-bribery and corruption (“ABC”) within this sphere. This
paper’s research aim is an exploratory evaluation of the ABC best practice policies
that exist within ISGBs, asking how they can be assessed and what best practice
policies currently exist within this framework. This paper undertakes a critical review of
the diverse ABC governance policies in the largest ISGBs through content analysis on
governance documents publically available on the sample ISGB websites. This review
was undertaken twice on the same ISGBs, in 2017 and 2020, and the changes reviewed.
The research highlights best practice policies for recommendation to all ISGBs, and
illuminates the absence of adequate policies with regards to the risk of bribery in ISGBs.
The findings show there was no area within the framework that ISGBs performed well at
as a collective, and there was no single ISGB whose anti-bribery policies were strong in
all areas. However, the comparison between 2017 and 2020 shows an improvement in
ABC policies in some ISGBs over the timeframe analyzed. The implications are a need
for sharing best practice in this area of governance, and providing global guidance on
ABC policies for ISGBs to ensure integrity in the sector.
Keywords: bribery, corruption, governance, sport, internal controls
INTRODUCTION
Bribery in sport is not an uncommon phenomenon. From boxer Eupolos bribing fellow Olympic
Games competitors in 388 BC (Spivey, 2012), to bookmakers bribing stable-boys to dope horses in
the 1960s (Reid, 2014), to FIFA Executive Committee members being bribed to secure their votes
(Blake and Calvert, 2015; Conn, 2018), sport is awash with examples of this form of corruption.
Bribery and corruption in international sport are rife, systemic, widespread, and linked to
stakeholders from athletes to sponsors, although the governance side of the game has gained most
attention. For example, FIFA’s 2015 governance corruption scandal led to most of their Executive
Committee indicted in the US or sanctioned internally (Conn, 2018).
Bribery damages the integrity and image of sport (Gorse and Chadwick, 2010; Kihl et al., 2017)
and undermines efficiency and growth within the industry (Azfar et al., 2001). Despite continuing
vulnerability to this form of corruption, there is limited literature on how International Sports
Governing Bodies (“ISGBs”) tackle bribery through the use of anti-bribery and corruption (“ABC”)
corporate governance and ethics policies.
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There are also no global, functional best practice guidelines
available for implementation by sport organizations (Michie
and Oughton, 2005), although some countries have created
their own, linked to public funding availability (Australian
Sports Commission, 2015, 2020; Sport England UK Sport, 2016).
The UN (2017) has also issued guidance on ABC measures
for countries tackling corruption in sport. ABC policies are
required to ensure that ISGBs can be held to account, and clear
policies allow for sanctions against breaches. Absence of adequate
policies therefore affects propensity for corruption, although
benchmarking of individual ISGB’s ABC governance is outside
the scope of this paper.
Challenges faced by the sport industry in designing and
implementing ABC policies include different structures and
hierarchies within ISGBs (Chappelet and Mrkonjic, 2013; Pielke,
2016; Gardiner et al., 2017), lack of awareness of governance
problems leading to conflict of interest and fraud (Brooks
et al., 2013; Kirkeby, 2016), and ability to indulge in regulatory
arbitrage for country of incorporation (Geeraert et al., 2014;
Pielke, 2016). For example, the 2015 FIFA scandal was linked to
problems with structure of both ISGB and member federations
(Tighe and Rowan, 2020), conflicts of interest (Blake and Calvert,
2015), and the protection that Swiss company law previously
afforded ISGBs (Associated Press, 2014).
As ISGBs are the regulators of their sport, an evaluation
of their ABC policies is required to understand the problem,
and provide best policy recommendations to other ISGBs. This
paper’s research aim is an exploratory qualitative evaluation
of ABC policies of ISGBs with regards to policy content and
language. This is done against the anti-bribery framework
developed by Philippou (2019) for assessing ABC policies based
on interdisciplinary corruption research. The intention is to
highlight best practice policies (and those missing) within this
framework currently adopted by some ISGBs, and outline issues
raised on the risk of bribery in ISGBs as a group.
This paper’s contribution to knowledge is a critical review of
the diverse current ISGB anti-corruption governance policies for
the prevention of bribery.
The next section of this paper argues that corporate
governance policies are applicable to ISGBs, then provides an
overview of ABC literature, followed by a section that outlines the
framework used and method employed in the assessment of ABC
policies, and a discussion of the results by framework element.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SPORT
The European Sports Charter states that “voluntary sports
organizations have the right to establish autonomous decision-
making processes within the law” (Council of Europe, 2001,
Article 3.3). While autonomy has led to self-regulation
(Forster and Pope, 2004; Forster, 2006; Chappelet, 2016), some
researchers have argued that ISGBs are indeed corporations
despite this status (Szymanski and Kuypers, 2000; Barker,
2013). Smith and Stewart (2010) noted that the unique
features of the sport industry have diminished since the
1990s from ten (Stewart and Smith, 1999) to four, including
having legally allowable monopolistic and/or oligopolistic
structures, supporting corporate governance policy applicability
to sports organizations.
Governance provides solutions to issues identified by agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) as applied to sport. Agency
problems can be caused by separation (Berle and Means, 1930)
between principals (resource allocators and stakeholders such as
fans and athletes) and agents (managers of these resources, such
as ISGBs).
ISGBs have developed into large revenue-takers and increased
their visibility (PWC, 2011, 2016; Gardiner et al., 2017).
Corporate governance of ISGBs is thus increasingly important
to governments and policy-makers. Political bodies such as
the Council of Europe now regard sport governance as a key
issue; they approved the 2013 Berlin Declaration calling for the
sport industry’s engagement with corporate governance issues
(Geeraert, 2016; Gardiner et al., 2017) and adopted the Good
Football Governance Resolution (Council of Europe, 2018).
Given the autonomy principle, with sport given special
dispensation under law (Council of Europe, 2001), it should
be unsurprising that ISGBs are different in their governance
and board structure when compared to other corporate
organizations, particularly with regards to lack of accountability,.
This is especially so when those charged with governance are
uninterested, unaware, and/or unable to recognize corruption
(Brooks et al., 2013; Kirkeby, 2016).
Proposed solutions to corporate governance problems (and
links to corruption) faced by ISGBs put forward by researchers
and policy-makers include:
• benchmarking (Geeraert, 2016) and reporting on corporate
governance measures (Chappelet and Mrkonjic, 2013);
• accountability for members’ actions, including controls over
receipt and use of funds (Ionescu, 2015; Pielke, 2016);
• improving transparency, including disclosure of senior
management salaries, and procurement methods (Geeraert
et al., 2013; Maennig, 2016; Menary, 2016; Transparency
International, 2016); and
• providing examples of good governance for other sports
governing bodies to follow (Pedersen, 2016) through a best
practice code (Michie and Oughton, 2005; Pielke, 2016).
Researchers have attempted to develop benchmarking tools for
assessing the strength of corporate governance structures in sport
organizations (not necessarily ISGBs). However, if autonomy
and self-regulation are indeed part of the reason for poor
governance across the sporting industry, then comparisons with
peer organizations would be of limited value as an ABC tool. The
Action for Good Governance in International Sport’s (“AGGIS”)
benchmarking tool targeted the areas of transparency, and checks
and balances. Both transparency and accountability linked to
checks and balances are frequently used controls in the ABC
sphere (Solomon, 2013, pp. 151–190) and are covered later in
this paper.
Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013) composed a set of indicators
for measuring corruption in sports governing bodies, including
organizational and reporting transparency, control mechanisms,
Frontiers in Sports and Active Living | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 649889
Philippou and Hines Anti-bribery Policies of ISGBs
and sport integrity, which overlap with the ABC framework
(Philippou, 2019) used in this paper. Other benchmarking that
has been applied to sport governance includes Play The Game’s
National Sports Governance Observer (Geeraert, 2018; Alm,
2019). There was, however, no explicit coverage of anti-bribery
measures within the benchmarking assessments, and this is a
suggested area for further research.
Limited research exists on ABC elements within sport
governance. One example includes Pielke (2016), who assessed
the conflict of interest and other ABC measures at FIFA against
a framework of accountability mechanisms (including legal,
market, peer, and public reputational accountability), but not
stakeholder accountability. Over the same period, FIFA did well
in the AGGIS benchmarking, coming second in the list of 35
Olympic sports federations (Geeraert, 2015).
The methods noted above have been rarely adopted with an
emphasis on ABC, although attempts to increase transparency
across a number of organizations has taken place over time,
and there is limited research into ABC corporate governance
applications for ISGBs. This paper aims to begin the process of
addressing this paucity of knowledge by analyzing best practice as
a first step toward an ABC best practice code in line with Michie
and Oughton (2005) and Pielke (2016).
BRIBERY
Like corruption (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Den Nieuwenboer
and Kaptein, 2008; Gorse and Chadwick, 2010; Rose, 2017),
bribery encompasses an array of definitional issues and is affected
by public sector literature bias. This may be in part due to the
sense in which sport is a public good even if the bodies running it
are not.
ISGBs are, usually, privately incorporated associations, in
which corruption is often internal to organizations (vote-rigging,
fraud, match-fixing), although senior executives have held public
office alongside their ISGB roles. One notable exception is
the hosting, by countries, of major sporting events such as
the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup. For these events,
government-provided infrastructure and entertaining of ISGB
members by public officials is often required, and external bribes
and procurement fraud may occur (Dorsey, 2015).
Bribery can be defined as the “offering, promising, giving,
accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for
an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust”
(Transparency International, 2017b). This definition is broader
than public-sector definitions (such as that of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002) in the US), despite
raising perspective issues through not defining the terms “ethics”
and “breach of trust,” and is therefore the one used in this paper.
There are limited empirical studies on bribery. Hanousek and
Kochanova (2016) found “local bribery environments” affected
firm performance in European countries, although the focus
was on public-sector officials. Rodrigues-Neto (2014) modeled
different forms of bribery to show that where monetary bribes are
paid, bargaining power of bribe-payers is relatively small. Other
works focus on detection or bribery within the framework of
corruption (see, for example, Ryvkin et al., 2017) or on problems
associated with bribery from a business perspective (Bray, 2007;
Transparency International, 2011). These latter studies are based
on perception, measuring beliefs rather than quantity (Sampford,
2006; Brooks et al., 2013). This paper analyses ABC policies
rather than quality or quantity of bribery incidences, although
perception does play a part in reputational damage suffered by
companies as a result of corruption.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There is a limited range of theoretical frameworks available for
critical evaluation of ABC policies. One such example is De
Waegeneer et al. (2016), who created a classification framework
for content analysis of ISGBs’ ethical codes’ effectiveness. This
included thematic and procedural classifications of content, both
of which are relevant to general governance policies, but not
explicitly concerned with ISGBs. Another is the TASP sport
corruption typology of Masters (2015), which can be applied
explicitly to instances of corruption in sport or framing specific
scandals within ISGBs.
Svensson (2005) describes corruption as an outcome ‘of a
country’s legal, economic, cultural and political institutions’.
Bribery, in turn, is an outcome of a number of similar variables,
both thematic and procedural, which need to be addressed in an
ABC policy.
Philippou (2019) sets out a theoretical framework for bribery
in sport governance. The framework (Figure 1) is split into
three parts: clarifying concepts (such as definitions of corruption
and bribery employed), assessing risk factors (economic rent,
discretionary powers, and culture), and assessing governance
(accountability, monitoring/control systems, and enforcement).
As this framework is explicitly concerned with ABC in sport
governance, and its production based on an amalgamation
of interdisciplinary ABC research, this is the framework used
in this paper. Its elements and the relevant literature are
discussed below.
CLARIFYING CONCEPTS: DEFINITIONS
The global scope and activities of ISGBs makes them subject to
varied ABC legislation and regulations, which internal policies
and codes need to comply with. The ISGBs’ ability to take
advantage of regulatory arbitrage (such as the ICC’s move from
the UK to Dubai in 2005) affects the policies and procedures
required and therefore enacted.
The US FCPA’s (1977, §78dd-3) definition of bribery requires
involvement of a public official (UK Government, 2010). The
UK Bribery Act 2010 has a much broader definition of bribery,
covering private sector bribery (and therefore ISGB officials),
passive as well as active bribery (both giving and receiving
a bribe), and facilitating payments. Facilitating payments are
inducements given to officials to perform routine business
transactions in their (legal) job. Facilitating payments are
allowable under the FCPA (Baughn et al., 2010), although
enforcement has tightened up in recent years.
ISGBs could potentially be affected by public-sector
facilitating payment definitions during sport event management
and related procurement activities, or during broadcast rights
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FIGURE 1 | Theoretical framework for bribery and ABC. Adapted from Philippou (2019).
negotiations. ISGBs could also be affected by private-sector
bribery in, for example, requesting support in the form of votes in
exchange for allocating funds to specific development programs.
Given the reputational risk from being embroiled in a
bribery scandal (Gorse and Chadwick, 2010), ISGBs should also
include unactioned (agreed but not acted upon) bribery in their
definitions. This is because mere agreement to conduct bribery
could still damage the ISGB’s reputation, as is the case with the
unproven allegations of match-fixing in tennis (Mitchell, 2016;
see, for example, Blake, 2016). By extension, when these practices
become endemic to the culture, it’s woven into the fabric of the
sport, as was the case with the cultural problems experienced by
the Australian cricket team (Lemon, 2018).
ASSESSING RISK FACTORS
Economic Rent
Policy-driven corruption theory is steeped in the tradition
of Klitgaard’s (1988) formula and Rose-Ackerman’s (1999)
framework, both of which attempt to understand (and reverse)
the causes of corruption. Both are limited to public-sector
corruption [although Klitgaard (1988, 1998b) does acknowledge
the existence of private-sector bribery]. As bribery is a subset
of corruption, both include economic rent in their respective
theoretical frameworks affecting ABC.
Economic rent is the concept of monopoly profit; it is
an unsustainable pricing level in the presence of competition
(Ricardo, 1821; Krueger, 1974). Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella
(1999) found that countries whose firms benefit from higher
levels of economic rent are more prone to corruption. Clarke
and Xu’s (2004) regression analysis of bribery in the utility
sector in transition economies also found economic rents to be
a corrupting factor, and bribery more likely in areas with lower
levels of competition and higher profitability.
ISGBs, by their very nature as global organizations, have
monopoly power over their sport or (in the case of the IOC) event
(Morgan, 2002). An exception to this is the oligopolistic structure
of professional [as opposed to amateur and professional, which
was governed by the AIBA (2018), despite their authority over
Olympic events being rescinded by the IOC (IOC, 2019; Morgan,
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2020)] boxing governance, which includes four main ISGBs (the
World Boxing Association, World Boxing Council, IBF/USBA,
and the World Boxing Organization). However, this is still
sufficiently limited to allow the ISGBs to extract economic rents
from fans and other stakeholders of the sport.
Discretionary Powers
Discretionary powers of governance officials affect levels of
corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Jain, 2001).
Autonomy enjoyed by sport governing bodies under law
(Geeraert et al., 2014, 2015; Chappelet, 2016) increase the levels
of discretionary powers that governance officials have over
their sport.
Culture
Clearly defining bribery affects behavior (Steidlmeier, 1999;
Transparency International, 2013a, Article 5.6.1). Cultural
attitudes to bribes affect tendency to both pay (Pitt and Abratt,
1986) and receive (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010) bribes. Thus,
care must be taken where “there are deep-rooted customs
regarding gifts and hospitality” (Transparency International,
2017a, Article 6.7), as well as other risk areas, as a result of the
global coverage of ISGBs.
Gifts and entertainment (or hospitality) is an important area
of ABC (Transparency International, 2013a, 2017a), and forms
part of cultural control. The need for gifts and entertainment
in ISGBs should be assessed as part of risk. There is also a
need to provide guidance on appropriate (sometimes zero) levels
above which receipts or donations could be construed as bribery.
For example, the UK Bribery Act 2010 [in contrast to the US
FCPA (1977)] makes no exemption for business promotion, so
marketing and entertainment (if the intention is corrupt) fall
within the scope of the Act regardless of value.
ASSESSING GOVERNANCE
Accountability
The increase in the role of the media (especially through
investigative journalism) has fuelled strong public demand for
ISGB accountability to stakeholders, including fans and taxpayers
(Ionescu, 2015). Conversely, it has been argued that the media
has facilitated corruption through biased positive reporting
of unethical sporting behavior (Whannel, 2002, pp. 290–292;
Numerato, 2009), such as hailing cheats as national heroes if a
country has won amajor sporting event despite corrupt behavior.
Transparency as a concept is broader than accountability
(defined below), and relates to clarity over the structure,
funding, spending, and conduct of an organization through
reporting “rules, plans, processes and actions” (Transparency
International, 2017c), although disclosure is an important aspect
of transparency, such as that found in the likes of the UK
Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2016). Care, however, must
be taken to avoid an “accountability-by-audit approach” (where
transparency in process is merely ameans to allow audit) (Henne,
2015), where generalist rules are not necessarily suitable for
the industry.
Klitgaard (1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1999) correlate greater
levels of administrator accountability to lower levels of
corruption and, therefore, bribery. In the case of (mainly private
company) ISGBs, it follows that, where there are no effective
mechanisms to hold senior officers accountable for their actions,
there are likely to be higher levels of bribery.
Accountability has been defined as holding organizations
“responsible for reporting their activities and executing their
powers properly” (Transparency International, 2017b), or having
actors hold others to a set of standards with sanctions available
if these are breached (Stiglitz, 2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005).
This includes clear lines of reporting for members, employees,
and other stakeholders being available, usually defined in policies
and procedures. Non controls (mainly policy) definitions of
accountability focus on actions over liability, although there
is confusion over the definition (Mcgrath and Whitty, 2018).
Accountability was defined in the controls sense in this paper,
as having a set of standards such as reporting on specific tasks,
having named senior officers responsible for clearly identified
specific tasks, and/or the organization or senior officers being
explicitly responsible for particular functions or actions within
an organization.
Transparency and accountability contribute to ABC as
scrutiny of governance leads to lower levels of bribery. For
example, Duggan and Levit (Duggan and Levitt, 2002) found
that increased media attention decreased match-fixing in
sumo wrestling.
Monitoring/Control
Monitoring is a form of resource control (Lipicer and Lajh, 2013)
and can include the use of compliance functions or ethics audits
(Mcnamee and Fleming, 2007).
Whistleblowing
One of the key methods of monitoring and control center
around whistleblowing. Whistleblowing policies allow members
to raise concerns about breaches of ethics, laws, and business
standards, and enable monitoring and control. For example,
the ACFE (2016) noted that “tips” was the most likely form of
detection but that “organizations with reporting hotlines were
much more likely to detect fraud through tips” than those
without. The importance of whistleblowing is also recognized
in Transparency International’s (Transparency International,
2013a, Article 6.5;2017a, Article 9.2) ABC guidance, and
increasingly by policy (see Sport Whistle, 2018) and sports
organizations (Cottrell and Erickson, 2018).
The confidentiality and safety of whistleblowing hotlines
is important for encouraging witnesses to come forward
with information (Soon and Manning, 2017). This is
recognized in various statutes worldwide, although cultural
differences pervade. Transparency International’s (Transparency
International, 2013b, p. 8) review of the whistleblowing laws
in the EU found only four countries (Luxembourg, Romania,
Slovenia, and the UK) had advanced provisions in their laws
for “whistleblowers in the public and/or private sectors,”
while seven had none or very limited provisions. The EU
stance on whistleblower protection has since been enhanced
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with the advent of the Directive on the protection of persons
reporting on breaches of Union law (European Parliament
Council of the European Union, 2019). The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (Congress.Gov, 2002, §1514A) in the US also penalizes
retaliation against whistleblowers.
Enforcement
Even if whistleblowing policies exist, enforcement of witness
protection and confidentiality rules and regulations increase the
tendency for whistleblowers to come forward with information
(ACFE, 2016). This enforcement ability also applies to all aspects
of governance policy and procedure, as enforcement is, to
a degree, positively correlated with adherence by individuals
subject to it (Croall, 2004).
Investigatory and enforcement powers are linked to
accountability, as ability to enforce decisions independently
signals that those in breach of policies and procedures will be
held accountable for doing so. (Geeraert et al., 2014) assessed
the corporate governance quality in 35 Olympic sport governing
bodies, including enforcement powers of the Ethics/Integrity
Committees of their sample ISGBs. Only one (UCI) had the
ability to initiate proceedings independently at the time.
From an economics perspective, Becker’s (1968) rational
choice theory was adapted to model public corruption utility
choices in South Korea and Hong Kong (Jin-Wook, 2009). This
approach was criticized for its simplicity, and was consequently
updated by Nichols (2012) to include the ability to use the bribe
in secret, perceived (rather than actual) risks of detection, and
emotional and psychological costs of acting corruptly. It therefore
helps explain why penalties (both criminal and social) form
an important part of ABC strategy, as enforcement powers are
needed to impose sanctions.
METHOD
The anti-bribery framework developed by Philippou (2019) was
used to critically evaluate the publically available ABC policies
and procedures of 22 ISGBs (listed inTable 1). Assessing the ABC
methods employed requires substantive disclosure evidence from
the ISGBs on their internal organizational structures and policies
employed. This is not always available, and differs from ISGB
to ISGB.
In line with the concept of economic rent influencing
corruption (Klitgaard, 1988), the sample of ISGBs used in
this research were the largest. This conforms with findings by
Maennig (2005), where only sports able to generate high income
(and economic rents) were affected by corruption, although
these findings may have been affected by selection bias in
classifying “major documented cases” (p. 190). This approach is
also consistent with the sample selection by Geeraert et al. (2014),
and Gorse and Chadwick (2011) in their analyses of governance
issues and corruption in sport respectively.
Arriving at a sample of the ISGBs with the largest revenues
was hindered by some ISGBs not publishing their financial
statements (covered in the transparency and accountability
section below). Therefore, the list of profitability by sport
is an incomplete one. The researchers proxied size to
TABLE 1 | Sampled sports and ISGBs.
Sport Governing body/bodies Abbreviation




American Football International Federation of
American Football
IFAF








World Boxing Association WBA




World Boxing Organization WBO
Cricket International Cricket Council ICC
Cycling Union Cycliste Internationale UCI
Football Fédération Internationale de
Football Association
FIFA
Formula 1 International Automobile
Federation
FIA






International Hockey Federation FIH
Horse-racing International Racing Bureau IRB




Skiing/snowboarding International Ski Federation FIS
Tennis International Tennis Federation ITF
Volleyball International Volleyball Federation FIVB
Olympics International Olympic Committee IOC
popularity, as defined by their visibility in the media and
on terrestrial broadcasting in the largest sports markets
(Chadwick, 2013, p. 515; Geeraert et al., 2014, 2015; PWC,
2016). Table 1 lists the sports sampled and their associated
ISGBs. Note that the IOC was included (and referred to as
an ISGB) in this paper because compliance with the IOC’s
regulations are the explicitly stated basis for many other
ISGBs’ policies.
All available documents on structure, governance, financial
controls, integrity, and anti-corruption were downloaded from
the sample ISGB websites in May 2017 and December 2020
and content analysis performed thereon. The analysis was
performed on two dates to also assess ISGB progress with regards
ABC policies.
Of the 22 ISGBs reviewed, one (IRB, 2017, 2020) had
no relevant documents available on their website (during
either timeframe).
The diversity of information available, and the relevant
conclusions drawn from this, is discussed in the section on
transparency and accountability.
Thematic analysis was undertaken on the ISGB documents
available following the approach set out by Braun and Clarke
Frontiers in Sports and Active Living | www.frontiersin.org 6 May 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 649889
Philippou and Hines Anti-bribery Policies of ISGBs
(2006, 2016), followed by the thematic [based on the Philippou
(2019) ABC framework] evaluation of the qualitative results
(Stemler, 2001; Robson and Mccartan, 2016; p. 349). These 95
(in 2017) and additional 82 (in 2020) documents were reviewed
and analyzed by the researchers, using NVivo qualitative data
analysis software. The first stage of coding involved reviewing
the policies within the documents. Themes were generated
from an initial coding run to identify any themes related
to anti-bribery and corruption. A second stage of coding
was then conducted on the content identified, amalgamating
any related codes (such as cash and monetary payments)
and splitting any codes that required it (such as ABC). The
codes were then compared to the framework and a final
analysis was performed on the data to ensure both the
themes arising from the data and framework concepts were
covered in the analysis. The process was then repeated in
2020 with the additional/updated documents downloaded in
December 2020.
RESULTS
Of the 22 ISGBs reviewed, 14 had an ABC policy of some
description in place in 2017, while a third had none publicly
available. In 2020, this was increased to 17 so that the absence
of ABC policies was less common across the group. Eight ISGBs
in 2017 and nine in 2020 had specific ABC policies, while others
had included themwithin other documentation such as a Code of
Conduct, Code of Ethics, or Constitution. This has implications
for all elements of the assessing governance section of the anti-
bribery framework, as lack of easy-to-find, clear-cut policies
might limit the strength of the internal control system. It also
supports the argument for increased need for staff training on
the topic.
Another issue was the inconsistency within ISGBs’ policies.
An example of poor practice in the 2017 batch was the ITF’s (a
private registered UK company subject to the UK Bribery Act
2010) policy, which noted that “payment of facilitation payments
by or on the behalf of the ITF is therefore only permitted
if the following conditions are met . . . ” (ITF, 2012). This
implied that facilitation payments are acceptable under certain
circumstances, although it then contradicts this in the same
document by (correctly, for a company registered in the UK)
defining facilitation payments as an example of non-permissible
bribery (ITF, 2012). In the 2020 sample for coding, the Anti-
Bribery and Corruption Code of Conduct had been replaced by
two anti-corruption program documents (ITF, 2020a,b), neither
of which specifically referenced bribery. Bribery was instead
referenced in the general anti-bribery and corruption clause in
the ITF Code of Ethics (ITF, 2019).
CLARIFYING CONCEPTS—DEFINITIONS
References coded to bribery and corruption themes included:
• Specific details on who is subject to the policy/procedure
• Specific anti match-fixing policy
• Definitions of bribery and corruption
• Examples of bribery and corruption
Who was subject to the policies differed across ISGBs sampled.
All applied to officials (see, for example, IFAF, 2012; IIHF,
2014a; World Rugby, 2017; Wbsc, n.d.) and/or athletes and
their representatives (IIHF, 2014a; WBC, 2015b). Some had
a very broad stakeholder scope, including “the cities and
countries wishing to organize” competitions’ (FIBA, 2014a), or
‘Representatives of sponsors, partners, suppliers, ski industry
and media dealing with FIS and/or have an involvement in
FIS activities’ (FIS, 2016b). These present best practice solutions
for corporate governance issues as put forward by Michie and
Oughton (2005) and Pielke (2016). Some ISGBs specifically
referred to stakeholders as a “family” (FIFA, 2012a; IAAF, 2015),
re-enforcing the idea of self-governing autonomy (Forster and
Pope, 2004; Forster, 2006), but also potentially contrary to the
independence ideals embedded in a culture of accountability and
transparency (Geeraert, 2016; Maennig, 2016).
The ITF and FIA were the only two from the 2017 sample of
ISGBs that defined the term bribery as “the offering, promising,
giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage (whether financial
or otherwise) as an inducement for an action which is illegal
or a breach of trust” (ITF, 2012), or the more specific
“improperly influenc[ing] anyone, or . . . reward[ing] anyone for
the performance of any function or activity, in order to secure
or gain any commercial, contractual, regulatory or personal
advantage” (FIA, 2017b). In the 2020 sample, FIFA defined
bribery as an “offer of anything valuable with the intent to gain
an improper business advantage” (FIFA, 2020e) and the IRL as
“an inducement or reward offered or promised in order to gain
any commercial or other advantage” (IRL, 2020a). These are
in line with the general definitions discussed previously (2002;
Transparency International, 2017b). The FIA further illustrate
best practice by providing examples, including “the giving of aid
or donations, the use of voting rights, designed to exert improper
influence” (FIA, 2017b).
Where references existed to bribery, the second round of
coding for each batch determined if non-financial bribery
was included (which is definitional-dependent). Non-financial
bribery is defined in this paper as the exchange of something
other than money in the course of the bribe, such as votes,
personal or political favors, or role allocation within an
organization. Non-financial bribery was defined in one of three
ways in the sample, with some ISGBs incorporating more than
one definition:
• “benefit or service of any nature” (see, for example, FIBA,
2014a; IIHF, 2014a; IGF, 2016b; FIA, 2017b)
• pecuniary/ monetary or other benefit/advantage (FIFA, 2012b;
ITF, 2012; IAAF, 2015; FIS, 2016b)
• “concealed benefit” (see, for example, FIH, 2012, n.d.; IOC,
2015a; UCI, n.d.)
Non-financial bribery aligns with the “breach of trust” element
of the Transparency International (2017b) definition of bribery,
and aligns with corruption seen in the 2015 FIFA scandal, where
favors were allegedly swapped for votes (Conn, 2018).
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The importance of reputational risk to ISGBs was noted,
including references to “illegal, immoral and unethical behavior”
(FIFA, 2012b), “foster[ing] public confidence in . . . governance
and administration” (ICC, 2014a), “refrain[ing] from unethical
behavior that may bring disgrace to many people involved in the
sport” (WBC, 2015a), and “not act[ing] in a manner likely to
tarnish the reputation of the Olympic Movement” (IOC, 2020a).
IFAF summaries this as “Public confidence in the authenticity
and integrity of the sporting contest and in the uncertainty of
its outcome is vital. If that confidence is undermined, the very
essence of the sport is compromised” (IFAF, 2017a). These results
support the narrative that integrity of sport is important to ISGBs.
It follows that ISGBs should therefore value ABC, given
bribery’s damaging nature to integrity (Gorse and Chadwick,
2010). In line with this, unactioned bribery should be covered
in best practice ABC policies, and it was indeed covered by
some ISGBs. For example, reference was made to breaches
occurring “irrespective of whether such benefit is in fact given
or received” (IGF, 2016a). However, it could be argued that
unactioned bribery is covered by the term “bringing the sport
into disrepute” (see, for example, IFAF, 2017b). The issue, from
an enforcement perspective, is the breadth of the latter term may
make it harder for investigators to prove compared to breaches





Documents were coded to the “gift and entertainment” theme if
they provided guidance for accepting and/or providing gifts and
entertainment to other parties.
Part of the difficulties faced by ISGBs is having to balance
international compliance requirements against cultural problems
(Pitt and Abratt, 1986) that may ensue in, for example,
countries where it is considered rude to decline a host’s gift
or entertainment offers (Steidlmeier, 1999). This has led to
some ISGBs providing generalist policies in their ABC efforts,
such as “The hospitality shown to the members and staff
. . . and the persons accompanying them shall not exceed the
standards prevailing in the host country” (FIBA, 2014a). This
“reasonableness test,” whereby an assessment by members is
required, suffers from the same self-regulation enforcement
problems that ISGBs are facing with regards general governance
(Geeraert et al., 2015; Chappelet, 2016). The FIA was the only
ISGB in the sample to explicitly state that “the intention behind
the gift should always be considered” (FIA, 2017b).
In line with Transparency International’s (Transparency
International, 2013a) ABC Principles, perception appears to
matter to ISGBs. The ICC (2014a) explicitly forbid gifts that
“influence or appear to influence the recipient in the discharge
of his official duties,” as do FIBA (2015) “in circumstances that
the Participant might reasonably have expected could bring
him or the sport into disrepute.” The FIA acknowledges the
importance of transparency, in line with Nichols (2012), stating
that a condition required of gifts is that they are “given openly,
not secretly” (FIA, 2017b), while FIFA (in the 2020 sample) “uses
a standard process to register gifts and hospitality and expects
every FIFA team member to follow it” (FIFA, 2020d).
Other best practice approaches were adopted by ISGBs.
ISGBs referenced gifts of a nominal, trivial, and/or symbolic
value only as being acceptable (see, for example, FIH, 2012;
IIHF, 2014a; FIFA, 2020f; UCI, n.d.), although arguably this
also requires a degree of reasonableness to be applied. Some
ISGBs explicitly prohibited the giving/receipt of “cash and cash
equivalents” (FIFA, 2012b; ITF, 2012; ICC, 2014a; IAAF, 2015;
FIA, 2017b; IFAF, 2017b) or “cash in any amount or form”
(FIFA, 2020f). Few ISGBs specified amounts above which gifts
and entertainment were considered unacceptable (ICC, 2014a,b;
IFAF, 2017b). Aside from providing the basis for ABC financial
controls, these policies also provide increased accountability for
members” actions (Ionescu, 2015; Pielke, 2016).
Specific circumstances are also considered when forming a
gifts and entertainment anti-bribery policy. For example, bribery
linked to vote-rigging is explicitly considered in relation to IOC
presidential elections: “Candidates may in no case and under no
pretext give presents, offer donations or gifts or grant advantages
of whatever nature” (IOC, 2015a). IFAF considers procurement
in its policy noting that “Particular care must be taken in relation
to gifts offered by suppliers, other commercial partners and
interested parties to influence decisions relating to the awarding
of commercial contracts with IFAF, particularly for media rights,
events and sponsorship” (IFAF, 2017b).
Finally, consideration of what to do with gifts that have
already been accepted is outlined. For example, the IOC policy
that gifts ineligible for acceptance “must be passed on to the
organization of which the beneficiary is a member” (IOC,
2015a, 2020a) is also found in other ISGBs (FIBA, 2014a;
IGF, 2016c; FIA, 2017b). While setting out parameters for
accountability (Geeraert et al., 2013; Maennig, 2016; Menary,
2016), this still presents a problem of what should be done
subsequent to this. For example, following the Brazilian
Football Association’s distribution of Parmigiani watches to FIFA
officials, the investigatory chamber decided against formal ethics
proceedings “should all watches be returned to it. The watches
will then be donated to an independent non-profit organization
or organizations committed to corporate social responsibility




Although forming part of the sport industry typology, differences
in the ISGBs’ aims may explain the lack of consistency in policies
and procedures. For example, most ISGBs in the sample included
both promoting/developing and setting the laws of their sport
in their mission statements or equivalents. All ISGBs in the
sample were hierarchical (Morgan, 2002) in their governance,
and the ISGBs did indeed present a different approach to
corporate governance compared to other charitable or corporate
organizations, with a clear industry-specific focus. For example,
the Olympic Charter (the statutes of the IOC), that a large
Frontiers in Sports and Active Living | www.frontiersin.org 8 May 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 649889
Philippou and Hines Anti-bribery Policies of ISGBs
number of ISGBs are signatories of, includes “preserv[ing] the
autonomy of sport” (IOC, 2015b, 2020b) in its mission.
In other areas, however, this commonality in aims diverges,
with some ISGBs having non-standard aims. The ISGB aims
not explicitly shared across the sample include “deliver[ing]
commercial value” (RLIF, 2017), providing “editorial services to
. . . publications” (IRB, 2017), and “upholding the interests of its
members in . . . tourism” (FIA, 2017c).
Aims are also likely to be influenced by their income sources.
For example, the majority of FIFA’s 2016 income came from
licensing rights to third parties (FIFA, 2017b) compared toWorld
Rugby (2016) from merchandising (directly from fans). This has
implications for both conflict of interest (Brooks, 2016; Kirkeby,
2016) and regulatory arbitrage (Pielke, 2016). Both these ISGBs
then saw the majority of their income come from broadcasting in
2019 (FIFA, 2020a; World Rugby, 2020b), a change that also has
similar implications.
Some ISGBs govern over leagues with sufficient (usually
economic) power to provide them with a voice in their own
governance. For example, Formula 1 (FIA, 2017c, 2020b) and
the NBA (FIBA, 2014b, 2019) have representation on decision-
making committees in their relevant sport, as manifested in their
statutes which may affect implementation of best practice (either
positively or negatively).
In a similar way, the power of certain countries are also
manifested in statutes of relevant ISGBs. For example, World
Rugby representatives on the Council have a vote specifically
allocated to “Unions . . . who play in . . . the Six Nations or
SANZAR Rugby Championships” (World Rugby, 2017).
Despite this diversity, most ISGBs note the importance of
integrity and reputation, supporting Gorse and Chadwick (2010).
For example, FIFA and the UCI both aim “to promote integrity,
ethics and fair play with a view to preventing all methods or
practices, such as corruption, . . . which might jeopardize the
integrity of” the sport (FIFA, 2016; UCI, 2016) and the WBC
(2015a) to promote “Clean, Fair, and Equitable Competition.”
Thus, this makes the existence of ABC policies both advisable and
desirable within their own stated aims.
Transparency and Accountability
Transparency is proxied as public availability of information.
One of the ISGBs reviewed had no relevant documents available
on their website, although they did have some very limited
information relating to aims and contacts (IRB, 2017), and so
were included in the analysis.
References demonstrating best practice accountability and
transparency are set out in Table 2.
Overall, the levels of ISGB accountability were inconsistent
both within and across ISGBs, as was the type of accountability
demonstrated. For example, the RLIF (2017) did not include
any of the above points in the 2017 sample, but did note the
need for “communicating openly and transparently.” In the 2020
sample, they noted that “An up-to-date register of interests
will be maintained by the IRL” (IRL, 2020b), although the
document did not specify individual roles accountable for this
maintenance or review of potential conflicts. No single ISGB
included information on all the points in Table 2. These findings
TABLE 2 | Examples of best practice accountability and transparency policies.




To whom ethics or other policy
breaches should be reported
“the FIFA Compliance
Division” (FIFA, 2020d)
Who appoints the Ethics Committee
or Ethics/Integrity Officer
“ICC’s Board of Directors”
(ICC, 2014a, 2017)
Who the Ethics Committee members
and/or Ethics/Integrity Officer(s) are
World Athletics (2020)
Who and/or what department holds
information regarding conflicts of
interest and/or policy breaches
“the 6 members of the
Ethics Committee and the 2
members of the Secretariat
of the Ethics Committee
only” (FIA, 2017a)
Who the signatories are for high-value
expenditure
“the General Secretary or
the Deputy General
Secretary” (IIHF, 2014b)
What meeting minutes are kept “the transcript of the
debates of the General
Assembly and World
Councils, which are
recorded on tape” (FIA,
2017d, 2019), although the
feasibility of access is
unclear
Who and/or what department retains
meeting minutes
“The Secretary General is
responsible for the minutes
of the Congress” (FIS,
2016c, 2018) “Minutes shall
be taken of every Congress”
(UCI, 2016, 2019)
What Committees and/or
Commissions exist and what their
responsibilities are
World Athletics (2020)
How officers are nominated “Nominations Committee”
FIA (2017d)
Whether accounts are audited and, if
so, who appoints the auditor
FIH (2012)
What activity reports are available, to
whom, and how copies can be
obtained
FIS (2016c, 2018)
are consistent with previous studies on ISGB accountability
(Chappelet and Mrkonjic, 2013; Geeraert et al., 2013; Geeraert,
2016) and demonstrate the continued need for accountability in
best practice ABC.
Some of the ISGBs published the names of the various
committee members, often on their websites, or noted that
they ‘shall be published’ (FIS, 2016b), but were not available
on the website in the 2017 or 2020 reviews. ISGBs also
noted specific responsibilities attached to roles, such as “the
Chief Administrative Officer shall . . . see that FIA accounts
are kept up to date” (FIA, 2017d, 2019). Some ISGBs also
noted specific powers attached to roles, such as “the Central
Board has the powers . . . to exercise overall control over the
financial management” of FIBA (2014b; 2019). The latter finding
showcases the officers’ discretionary powers in a transparent way,
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which is a positive step towardminimizing corruption (Klitgaard,
1998a; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Jain, 2001).
Some ISGBs made particular reference to accountability
and transparency in their documents. Examples include the
“basic universal principles of good governance of the Olympic
and sports movement, in particular transparency, responsibility
and accountability, must be respected” (FIH, 2012), that “all
bodies, whether elected or appointed, shall be accountable to
the members of the organization and, in certain cases, to their
stakeholders” (IOC, 2015a, 2020a), and to “seek transparency and
strive to maintain a good compliance culture with checks and
balances” (FIFA, 2012a). In the 2020 sample, it was noted that
“One of the fundamental pillars of FIFA 2.0 is the transparency




References to whistleblowing in the sample were scarce in the
2017 sample. The ITF (2012) noted that a policy exists, but as
this was only internally available from the “HR department or in
[the] HR shared files,” its contents could not be reviewed by the
researchers. TheWBSCmade reference to whistleblowing in case
of actual or “probable cause to believe” (Wbsc, n.d.) a breach has
occurred, but no system to do so was set out in their documents.
Direct references to reporting hotlines in ISGB documents,
something highly important for monitoring (Transparency
International, 2013a, 2017a; ACFE, 2016), was also scarce in
the 2017 sample. Some referenced their own (IOC, 2015a; IGF,
2016a, 2017a; FIFA, 2017a,c; UCI, 2017), and one asked their
members to use the IOC’s Integrity and Compliance hotline (FIS,
2016a). Of those with their own hotlines, one related solely to
doping (UCI, 2017) and therefore cannot be considered as part
of general ABC policy. Only the IOC had a clear and easy-
to-find hotline if one followed the documented references. The
IGF hotline was unavailable from the link listed in their Anti-
betting and Corruption Policy (IGF, 2016a) when the researchers
attempted to access the link in both March and December 2017,
but was available from a different URL (IGF, 2017b) after a brief
search on the IGF website. Difficulties were also experienced with
the FIFA hotline. While FIFA documents made reference to a
hotline being set up (FIFA, 2017a) and monitored (FIFA, 2017c),
the researchers were unable to find a direct link to this from the
FIFA website as at both March and December 2017, although
they found the link to FIFA’s hotline clearly referenced on, and
accessible from, the IOC’s website (2017). These findings are in
line with the whistleblowing shortcomings discussed by Cottrell
and Erickson (2018), and the alleged treatment of whistleblowers
by FIFA in the 2015 scandal (Conn, 2018).
The 2020 sample shows that there has been some
improvement across ISGBs on this front, with integrity
hotlines available across a number of ISGBs (ICC, 2020; TIU,
2020; World Rugby, 2020a; see, for example, FIS, 2020). IFAF
has a whistleblower policy document available on their corporate
documents webpage (IFAF, 2017c), although there was no other
reference to this. The IGF has a dedicated hotline section (IGF,
2020a), although the link to their Anti-betting and Corruption
Policy (IGF, 2020c) did not work as at December 2020 and there
was potential for conflict of interest as ‘The Head of the IGF
Integrity Unit is . . . the person in charge of the IGF Integrity
Hotline and is skilled at providing impartial and confidential
support to the person reporting” (IGF, 2020b). FIFA resolved
their issue for the 2020 sample and had multiple references to
their confidential reporting system (FIFA, 2020b), although their
Code of Conduct had nine references to report or contact the
FIFA Compliance Division but no links to this or how to do this
in the document (FIFA, 2020d). World Athletics now has the
independent Athletics Integrity Unit’s reporting system available
(Athletics Integrity Unit, 2020).
There were also limited references to best practice protection
of whistleblowers’ and/or witnesses’ identity in policy breach
proceedings to encourage the practice (Soon and Manning,
2017). The IOC (2015a) noted that “A complainant may
request that his/her identity not be revealed and that all
precautions be taken so that his/her identity is protected,”
while the UCI (n.d.) noted that they “shall take all required
measures in order to safeguard the interests and personal
rights of witnesses and, if necessary, ensure they remain
unidentified.” However, the most detailed policy around the
anonymity of witnesses was that of FIFA: “When a person’s
testimony . . . could endanger his life or put him or his
family or close friends in physical danger, the chairman of the
competent chamber or his deputy have powers to maintain
confidentiality” (FIFA, 2012b).
The ITF (2012) specifically mentioned culture, wishing to
“encourage . . . individuals [to] feel able to raise concerns” and
“strictly prohibits the taking of retaliatory action” and in the 2020
sample had set up a new integrity body (TIU, 2020). Other ISGBs
with explicit policies on retaliation against whistleblowers (like
those stipulated by laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley in the US and the
EU Whistleblowing Directive) included the IGF (2017a, 2020d),
which “provide protection against any unjustified treatment in
the form of providing confidential advice to whistle-blowers... If
physical protection is needed, the case is referred to the police”
and FIFA (2012b, 2020f).
Enforcement
This paper’s review of enforcement powers of the Ethics/Integrity
Committees found that both samples showed very low levels
of ISGB Ethics/Integrity Committees with investigatory and
disciplinary powers. While most had the power to request
information from individuals subject to the ISGB rules and
regulations, a small minority had the power to instigate their own
investigations. One that did was the IAAF Ethics Commission in
the 2017 sample which could work on matters that it “of its own
initiative considers to be appropriate for it to undertake” (IAAF,
2015). The 2020 sample showed that a number of the ISGBs had
set up independent integrity units (Athletics Integrity Unit, 2020;
TIU, 2020).
Even fewer ISGBs had the power to sanction, an important
element of ABC to encourage compliance (Croall, 2004). For
example, the ICC (2014a) “Ethics Officer . . . submit[ing] his
written report to the . . . Board for its ultimate determination
on what action, if any, should be taken in respect of the alleged
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violation” takes the power away from the investigator and puts
it into the hands of non-independent officers. This was replaced
in the 2020 sample with “the Ethics Officer will refer the matter
to the Ethics Disciplinary Committee, which shall normally be
comprised of the Chief Executive, the ICC Chairman and the
Chair of the Audit Committee” unless it “decides that a greater
sanction than a warning and/or reprimand is warranted,” in
which case it “shall refer the matter to the Ethics Tribunal”
(ICC, 2017). Similarly, the FIBA Ethics Council should “submit
to the FIBA Central Board a report . . . noting any breaches of its
rules . . . [and] will propose . . . sanctions which might be taken
against those responsible” (FIBA, 2014a), but not impose those
sanctions itself.
Committees” independence (to enable accountability and
limit abuse of powers) was also low. However, definitions of
independence were not clarified which, given the extent of
conflict of interest issues found in sport as highlighted in this
paper, should be treated with caution. Sometimes independence
is implied but not explicit, such as for “The FIS Ethics
Commission [which] is composed of five persons appointed by
the FIS Council; three/four external to FIS and one/two members
of the FIS Council” (FIS, 2016b). This also links in with the idea
of discretionary powers (Klitgaard, 1988).
Enforcement powers for decisions were rare. Instead,
many of the ISGB Ethics Committees had the remit to
investigate but not sanction, such as in the case of the FIA
(2017b, 2020a), where the Ethics Committee “shall submit a
report to the President . . . who may decide to take further
action.” Inability to sanction limits the value of the policies
(Croall, 2004).
Sometimes there was no clear enforcer defined, which
is also problematic from an accountability viewpoint. For
example, FIFA (2012b) Code of Ethics notes that commissions
“are forbidden . . . unless the applicable body has expressly
permitted them to do so’. The applicable body in question
is not defined in this case, nor is an individual or official
role named as the decision-maker. This restricts decision-
making ability (and therefore accountability), but also arguably
provides officials within FIFA and member associations with
discretionary powers, something also linked to increased
bribery (Klitgaard, 1988).
Some ISGBs publically list violations or decisions. For
example, FIBA (2015) “maintains a list of violations and
sanctions which is made available on the FIBA website,” while
FIFA (2017a, 2020c) publishes Ethics Committee matters and
sanctions. This is a positive step toward transparency (Maennig,
2005; Geeraert et al., 2013).
PROGRESS
There was evident progress in the amount and quality of ABC
material provided by ISGBs between the two sample periods
(see Table 3), FIFA and the ITF in particular. Aside from
illustrating some ISGBs’ growing commitment to transparency
and accountability, this also supports Ionescu (2015) research
on the role of the media in increasing accountability, as
TABLE 3 | Key policy improvements 2017–2020.
Framework element Key best practice policy
improvements 2020
Clarifying concepts More ISGB examples of clear
definitions of bribery (FIFA, 2020e;
IRL, 2020a)
Culture Gift registers (FIFA, 2020d)
Accountability Register of interests (IRL, 2020b)
Transparency as a fundamental aim
(FIFA, 2019)
Whistleblowing Improved availability of integrity
hotlines (FIS, 2020; ICC, 2020; TIU,
2020) More references across ISGBs
to confidential hotlines (Athletics
Integrity Unit, 2020; FIFA, 2020d)
Enforcement Independent integrity units (Athletics
Integrity Unit, 2020; TIU, 2020)
Sanctioning decisions published
(FIFA, 2020c)
these changes were likely brought in as a result of media
scrutiny (Ingle, 2017).
CONCLUSION
This paper critically reviewed governance policies for the
prevention of bribery in a sample of 22 ISGBs using the anti-
bribery framework developed by Philippou (2019). The diversity
of both the quantity and quality of information on corporate
governance and/or ABC policies is part of the problem that
needs to be addressed by future guidance. It is difficult for
members and stakeholders to know where to look for ABC
information, as this is distributed among statutes, codes of ethics,
codes of conduct, or other documents. Future quantitative
research can be undertaken to assess policy frequency
and distribution.
Qualitative examples of both good and poor practice
currently followed by some ISGBs were highlighted across
both periods and are summarized in Table 4. There was no
single area of the framework that ISGBs performed well at
as a collective, and there was no single ISGB whose ABC
policies were strong across all areas. A recommended subject
for further research is whether particular characteristics of
ISGBs positively affect particular aspects of their governance and
ABC procedures.
There are limitations of using publically available information
for this study, as the information may be incomplete. However,
this also reflects the lack of transparency and accountability of
the ISGBs in question, and arguably contributes to the likelihood
of bribery by those charged with governance (Klitgaard, 1988)
of sport.
In terms of clarifying concepts (Philippou, 2019),
clear ABC policies on their websites, defining bribery,
or including unactioned bribery (which would affect
reputation), were few, and there were a number of
inconsistencies within ISGBs’ own policies. Thus,
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TABLE 4 | Examples of good practice.
Framework aspect Examples of good practice
Definitions Bribery and corruption clearly defined
(FIA; FIFA; IRL; ITF)
Non-financial bribery covered in
discussions of ABC (FIBA; FIFA; FIH;
FIS; IGF; IIHF; IOC; ITF; UCI)
Bribery and corruption examples
provided (FIA)
Gifts and entertainment Clear gift policy with references to:




(FIFA; FIH; IIHF; UCI)
• Specific maximum currency value
(ICC; IFAF)
Cash or cash equivalents prohibited
(FIA; FIFA; IAAF; ICC: IFAF; ITF)
Transparency and accountability Internal reporting—breaches and
responsible individuals (FIA; FIBA;
FIFA)
Ethics Committee or Ethics/Integrity
appointments and members (ICC,
World Athletics)
Information gatekeepers (FIA)
Signatories are for high-value
expenditure (IIHF)
Meeting minutes – keepers and
responsible parties (FIA; FIS; UCI)
Whistleblowing Accessible ABC reporting hotline
(FIFA; FIS; ICC; ITF; UCI; World
Rugby)
Confidentiality (FIFA; IOC; UCI)
Open culture (IGF; ITF; World
Athletics)




ISGBs should focus on clarity and consistency when
strengthening their ABC policies, starting with defining
what it is that they expect their members and stakeholders
to avoid.
Governance structures found supported the applicability of
corporate governance ABC policies to ISGBs, in line with Smith
and Stewart (2010) paper on the sport industry’s declining
uniqueness. Governance aims of the sample ISGBs converged
with regards the importance of integrity, supporting research on
risks arising from a lack of integrity (Gorse and Chadwick, 2010).
This shows the importance of industry reform in line with other
industries, as opposed to an introverted outlook often adopted by
sport organizations.
Accountability was deemed important by ISGBs in their
documents, but no single ISGB included full information on
roles, conflicts, personnel responsible, and so on, while one ISGB
had no documents available at all. This paucity in transparency
was in line with findings by Geeraert et al. (2014) and is another
focus for IGBS looking to undertake reform of their governance
and ABC policies and procedures.
Clear gifts and entertainment policies existed, but
only one specified a maximum acceptable level of spend.
Given the number of reputation-afflicting scandals linked
to gifts and entertainment, and the cultural shift away
from these as a method of doing business, focus on
these policies would enhance the current ABC provisions
in ISGBs.
The majority of monitoring and control (Philippou, 2019)
references related to whistleblowing. These were, on the whole,
scarce, with some ISGBs making reference to reporting hotlines,
which can help identify breaches (ACFE, 2016), and a minority
to protection of whistleblowers, which help more come forward
(Soon and Manning, 2017).
Enforcement powers were low, thus limiting their
effectiveness (Croall, 2004), without committees having the
power to sanction, while a lack of independence in ISGBs
sampled increases discretionary powers of governing officials
and therefore the likelihood of bribery (Klitgaard, 1988).
There are, of course, limitations to generalizing the results
of this study to all ISGBs. Each ISGB, as shown in this
paper, caters to different stakeholders, has different aims,
with different governance structures, and very diverse
revenue streams and levels. However, this study also
highlights why best practice needs to be tailored to the
sport industry as a whole, and why ISGBs should share
and act on good practice (such as the examples provided
by Interpol (2020) on their bi-weekly bulletins, or ESSA
(2017).
Most importantly in terms of the practical application
of this research for best practice, the existence of robust
ABC policies and procedures still requires adherence
to and enforcement of these principles. For example,
FIFA came under criticism in 2017 for not renewing the
independent Ethics Committee’s terms, thereby damaging
ongoing internal investigations into corruption (Conn,
2017a,b).
The need therefore remains for sharing best practice,
and providing guidance on, ABC policies for ISGBs, via the
IOC or external enforcement organizations such as UNODC
(2018) or stakeholder pressure groups such as SIGA (2017).
Future research should engage with stakeholders and ABC
practitioners to create a practical and realistic blueprint for
best practice in the sport industry and beyond (Michie and
Oughton, 2005; Pedersen, 2016; Pielke, 2016). This could
be done through interviews or focus groups with ABC
professionals, sport governance officers, legal personnel,
and stakeholders to analyze perceptions of corruption and
ABC in ISGBs against the Philippou (2019) and/or the
Masters (2015) frameworks. This can be complimented
with research ranking ISGBs by expanding Geeraert’s
(2018) system to include ABC, and to benchmark the
ISGBs sampled.
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There is a need to fill the research gaps that exist in relation
to both the incidence of bribery, and the fight to prevent it,
including research around policy issues and requirements for
robust ABC policies, in order to allow for “sport played and
governed under the highest integrity standards, free from any
form of unethical, illicit and criminal activity” (Siga, 2017).
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